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WINSTON CHURCHILL ON THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA†
I am not a lawyer, but I have obeyed a lot of laws, and
helped to make a few.1
— Winston S. Churchill

Though best known for leading Britain during World War II,
Winston Churchill was a keen observer of constitutional law.2
Most of his insights concerned the unwritten conventions of the
British Constitution,3 but Churchill also commented extensively
on the American Constitution.4 Intellectual curiosity and a desire to forge a closer alliance between Great Britain and the
United States were at the root of Churchill’s interest in the
institutions of what he called “The Great Republic.”5 As with all
things Churchill, his observations on our Constitution were
sometimes inspiring, sometimes illuminating, and sometimes
noxious.6
†
Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana Robert H. McKinney School of
Law. My thanks to Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Richard Primus, and Amanda Tyler
for their comments on drafts.
1
Winston S. Churchill, America and Britain (Apr. 7, 1954), in 8 WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 8559, 8559 (Robert Rhodes
James ed., 1974) [hereinafter CHURCHILL SPEECHES] (accepting an Honorary
Doctorate of Law from the Board of Regents of the State University of New York).
2
There are many books about Churchill’s life, though in my opinion the best
single-volume biography from a British perspective is ROY JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A
BIOGRAPHY (2001).
3
See, e.g., KEVIN THEAKSTON, WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION (2004).
4
See, e.g., Winston Churchill, What Good’s a Constitution?, COLLIER’S WEEKLY,
Aug. 22, 1936), at 22, 39–40.
5
See, e.g., WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF AMERICA,
at XV (Winston S. Churchill ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE GREAT REPUBLIC] (noting
that Churchill often referred to America as The Great Republic); The EnglishSpeaking Peoples (Mar. 8, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7293–
94 (calling Virginia “a cradle of the Great Republic”). The fact that Churchill’s
mother, Jennie Jerome, was American may also have been a factor. See THE GREAT
REPUBLIC, supra, at IX.
6
Compare Their Finest Hour (June 18, 1940), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 6231, 6238 (“Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or

715

716

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.94:715

This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of
Winston Churchill’s views on American constitutional law. In his
multi-volume A History of the English Speaking Peoples, Churchill discussed the drafting and the ratification of the Constitution in detail.7 In a series of op-eds and magazine articles based
on his trips to the United States, Churchill brought his acute
political sense to bear on the operation of the Constitution during
Jim Crow, Prohibition, and the New Deal.8 And in speeches to
British and American audiences over many decades, Churchill
frequently turned to our Constitution as both a model and a foil.9

lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the
world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole
world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for,
will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more
protracted, by the lights of perverted science.”), with A Seditious Middle Temple
Lawyer (Feb. 23, 1931), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4982, 4985 (“It
is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple
lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well-known in the East, striding half-naked
up the steps of the Vice-regal palace, while he is still organizing and conducting a
defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the
representative of the King-Emperor. Such a spectacle can only increase the unrest in
India and the danger to which white people there are exposed.”).
7
See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 3 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
PEOPLES: THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 210–14 (1957) [hereinafter AGE OF REVOLUTION].
Churchill was a prolific author and won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953. The
following quote from Churchill captures why I love what I do:
The fortunate people in the world—the only really fortunate people in the
world, in my mind,—are those whose work is also their pleasure. The class
is not a large one, not nearly so large as it is often represented to be; and
authors are perhaps one of the most important elements in its composition. . . . Whether a man writes well or ill, has much to say or little, if
he cares about writing at all, he will appreciate the pleasures of
composition. To sit at one’s table on a sunny morning, with four clear hours
of uninterruptible security, plenty of nice white paper, and
a . . . pen. . . . that is true happiness. The complete absorption of the mind
upon an agreeable occupation—what more is there than that to desire?
The Joys of Writing (Feb. 17, 1908), in 1 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 903,
903.
8
See Winston S. Churchill, What I Saw in America of Prohibition, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 1929), at 10 [hereinafter Prohibition]; Winston S. Churchill, The
Constitutions of Great Britain and the United States, DAILY MAIL (June 6, 1935), at
12 [hereinafter Constitutions of Britain and the United States].
9
Compare Parliament Bill (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, 7563, 7565 (arguing against the curtailment of the House of Lords’ power to
delay legislation by citing that “[t]he American Constitution, with its checks and
counterchecks, combined with its frequent appeals to the people, embodied much of
the ancient wisdom of this island”), with America and Britain, supra note 1, at 8559
(“[I]t is a fact that American law is more wedded to the older versions of English law
than is the case in Britain, where in the first half of the nineteenth century a great
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From these rich sources, three relevant themes emerge for
modern jurisprudence and constitutional design. First, Churchill
emphasized the continuity between British tradition and the
great eighteenth-century texts written here, most notably in his
innovative claim that the Declaration of Independence was the
supreme articulation of the common law.10 Second, Churchill
argued that judicial review was essential in the United States
due to its unusual diversity—an explanation that challenges
James Madison’s analysis of factions in Federalist No. 10.11
Third, Churchill contended that the failures of the Fifteenth and
Eighteenth Amendments—Black voting and Prohibition—during
the 1920s were the result of a supermajority with good intentions
enacting broad changes that were too unequally spread across
society to sustain their enforcement.12 His hard-headed realism
about how lopsided effects in constitutional law can cripple its
authority even when reforms have supermajority backing is a
lesson that should receive more attention, in part because that
lesson can help to justify some of the antimajoritarian aspects of
our constitutional structure.
Part I of this Article examines Churchill’s views on
constitutionalism and the parallels that he drew between the
legal principles of Britain and America. Part II explores the

deal of technical modernization was effected. Although I like old things better than
new, I believe our revised version has many conveniences in procedure.”).
10
See, e.g., “The Third Great Title-Deed” of Anglo-American Liberties (July 4,
1918), in 3 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 2613, 2614 [hereinafter Third
Great Title-Deed] (hailing the Declaration of Independence as a common-law
landmark comparable to the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights).
11
See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; Liberty and the Law
(July 31, 1957), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, 8682, 8683; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64–65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see infra
text accompanying notes 113–121.
12
See Prohibition, supra note 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”);
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (“After one year from the ratification of this article
the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.”), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”); Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013) (describing the impotence of the Fifteenth
Amendment until 1965); cf. Guido Calabresi, Foreword, Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 80, 130–31 (1991) (making some related points about disparate impact and
judicial review).
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evolution of Churchill’s thought on a crucial difference between
these kindred systems—judicial review—and his hypothesis that
diversity explains the distinction. Finally, Part III focuses on
Churchill’s attack on Prohibition and his surprising connection of
that failure to the establishment of a central pillar of Jim Crow.
I. A COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE
In an address to a joint session of Congress a few weeks after
the United States declared war on Nazi Germany, Churchill declared: “I have been in full harmony all my life with the tides
which have flowed on both sides of the Atlantic against privilege
and monopoly, and I have steered confidently towards the
Gettysburg ideal of ‘government of the people by the people for
the people.’ ”13 This Part looks at Churchill’s constitutional beliefs
and his rhetoric stressing the bonds between British and
American democracy in furtherance of that alliance. The most
striking example was his claim that the Declaration of Independence is one of these bonds rather than a fracture, which muted
the anti-colonial understanding of Jefferson’s text in line with
Churchill’s wholehearted support for imperialism.14
A.

Upholding Liberal Democracy

To understand Winston Churchill’s constitutional philosophy,
we must first clear up the common misunderstanding that he saw
democracy as a second-best solution. The misunderstanding
stems from his line to the House of Commons, which is often

13
A Long and Hard War (Dec. 26, 1941), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note
1, at 6536, 6536; see Parliament Bill, supra note 9 (“Government of the people, by the
people, for the people, still remains the sovereign definition of democracy.”); see
generally GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE
AMERICA (1992) (thoroughly analyzing the Gettysburg Address). One notable
example of Churchill’s fight against privilege was his effort to end the absolute veto
of the unelected House of Lords over legislation. See Parliament Bill (Feb. 22, 1911),
in 2 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 1692, 1694–96, 1700; see also Gerard N.
Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. L. REV. 303, 319–22 (2011) (providing
some background on the debate that led to the Parliament Act of 1911).
14
See, e.g., The Anglo-American Alliance (July 4, 1950), in 8 CHURCHILL
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 8031, 8032 (hailing “the Declaration of Independence,
which has become a common creed on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean”); see also
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 212 (1997) (discussing the decline in the revolutionary thrust of the
Declaration over time).
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quoted as “democracy is the worst form of government—except for
all the others.”15 What he actually said was:
[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that
the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public
opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape,
guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their
servants and not their masters.16

In other words, Churchill rejected the jaded view that democracy
was worthwhile due only to the absence of the flaws that plagued
other political systems.17 He instead celebrated, albeit imperfectly, liberal principles such as the right to vote, jury trial, freedom
of speech, and religious freedom throughout his career.18
15

See, e.g., Barack H. Obama, Remarks at Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens, Greece (Nov. 16, 2016); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting
Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 68 VAND. L. REV. 441, 447 (2015).
16
Parliament Bill, supra note 9, at 7566.
17
A more precise statement of Churchill’s belief in democracy’s strength was:
“In a society where there is democratic tolerance and freedom under the
law, many kinds of evils will crop up, but give them a little time and they
usually breed their own cure.” I do not see any reason to doubt the truth of
that.
There is no country in the world where the process of self-criticism and
self-correction is more active than in the United States.
America and Britain, supra note 1, at 8560 (quoting his American mentor Representative Bourke Cockran); see id. at 8559–60 (“I am a great believer in democracy and
free speech. Naturally when immense masses of people speak the same language
and enjoy the fullest rights of free speech they often say some things that all the
others do not agree to. If speech were always to be wise it could never be free, and
even where it is most strictly regulated it is not always wise.”).
18
See Prolongation of Parliament (Oct. 31, 1944), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES,
supra note 1, at 7020, 7023 (“At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is
the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross
on a piece of paper—no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly
diminish the overwhelming importance of that point.”); Capital Punishment (July
15, 1948), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7686, 7696 (“We do not allow
the decision of guilt or innocence to be decided in the first instance by trained legal
minds or persons of exceptional education. The prime guarantee of British justice is
the honest opinion of the ordinary man or woman.”); What Good’s a Constitution?,
supra note 4, at 40 (“[T]he right of freedom of speech and publication is extended,
under the [British] Constitution, to those who in theory seek to overthrow
established institutions by force of arms so long as they do not commit any illegal
act.”); Prayer Book Measure (June 14, 1928), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note
1, at 4441, 4442 (“To refuse to a religious community a wider latitude in spiritual
matters is a very objectionable step for any modern Legislature to take. It appears to
be contrary to the spirit of religious toleration which, I am quite sure, would rule the
House of Commons in the case of any other faith or sect among the hundreds which
exist side by side within the circuit of the British Empire.”). For thoughts on
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In assessing constitutional legitimacy, Churchill took a
pragmatic stance tempered by respect for tradition.19 To a Dutch
audience in 1946, he gave his “conception of free democracy based
upon the people’s will and expressing itself through representative assemblies under generally accepted constitutional forms.”20
He named some
simple, practical tests by which the virtue and reality of any
political democracy may be measured. Does the Government in
any country rest upon a free, constitutional basis, assuring the
people the right to vote according to their will, for whatever
candidates they choose?21

For example: “Is there the right of free expression of opinion, free
support, free opposition, free advocacy and free criticism of the
Government of the day? Are there Courts of Justice free from
interference by the Executive or from threats of mob violence,
and free from all association with particular . . . parties?”22 “Will
these courts,” he asked,
administer public and well-established laws associated in the
human mind with the broad principles of fair play and justice?
Will there be fair play for the poor as well as for the rich? Will
there be fair play for private persons as well as for Government
officials? Will the rights of the individual, subject to his duties
to the state, be maintained, asserted and exalted?23

Churchill’s lukewarm support of women’s suffrage, see THEAKSTON, supra note 3, at
101–12.
19
For Churchill’s views on the value of tradition, see The Sinews of Peace (Mar.
5, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7285, 7288 (“[C]ourts of justice,
independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which
have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and
custom.”); “The Sandys Storm” (July 11, 1938), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 5992, 5995 (quoting Benjamin Disraeli’s maxim that “[n]ations are ruled
by force or by tradition” and adding: “[t]here is no humiliation in bowing to tradition”); “A Sense of Crowd and Urgency” (Oct. 28, 1943), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES,
supra note 1, at 6869 (arguing that the bombed House of Commons chamber should
be rebuilt in exactly the same form in part because “[l]ogic is a poor guide compared
with custom”).
20
The United States of Europe (May 9, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 7318, 7321.
21
Id. at 7321–22; see The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19 (“[T]he people of any
country have the right, and should have the power by constitutional action, by free
unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of
government under which they dwell.”).
22
The United States of Europe, supra note 20, at 7322.
23
Id. Churchill listed nearly the same tests in a 1936 magazine article that is
discussed in Part II. See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39.
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Churchill’s invocation of fair play as a constitutional principle
is worth dwelling on for a moment because that idea has largely
dropped out of legal discourse.24 Unlike “the rule of law,” the
ideal popularized by the British theorist A.V. Dicey that is now an
important way of describing what liberal democracy epitomizes,
“fair play” connotes a substantive standard that informs all government actions, not just judicial decisions.25 When President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered a speech on the 150th anniversary of
the Constitutional Convention, he explained:
The surest protection of the individual and of minorities is that
fundamental tolerance and feeling for fair play which the Bill of
Rights assumes. But tolerance and fair play would disappear
here as it has in some other lands if the great mass of people
were denied confidence in their justice, their security and their
self-respect.26

The Supreme Court of the United States adopted fair play as a
standard in its canonical personal jurisdictional decision—International Shoe Co. v. Washington—but that is the only way in
which fair play still plays a self-conscious role in law.27
Churchill’s next linchpin for constitutional democracy was an
independent judiciary, which he called “the foundation of many
things in our island life.”28 “The only subordination which a judge
knows in his judicial capacity,” he stated, “is that which he owes
to the existing body of legal doctrine enunciated in years past by
his brethren on the bench, past and present, and upon the laws
passed by Parliament which have received the Royal Assent.”29

24

See, e.g., Justin Tosi, A Fair Play Account of Legitimate Political Authority, 23
LEGAL THEORY 55 (2017).
25
See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179–91 (7th ed. 1908).
26
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), in
1937 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 366
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
27
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (referring to “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice”).
28
Judges’ Remuneration Bill (Mar. 23, 1954), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 8544, 8547 (arguing for a pay increase for judges).
29
Id. (“The relations between the Judiciary and the Legislature are also
exceptional and privileged. Parliament has deliberately maintained the judges in a
special position, not only by charging their salaries to the Consolidated Fund so that
they do not fall within the annual scrutiny of Parliament, but also by eschewing any
claim to criticise a judge’s conduct in his judicial capacity except on a special Motion
for an Address to the Crown for the judge’s removal.”).
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As a result,
[t]he service rendered by judges demands the highest qualities
of learning, training and character. . . . A form of life and conduct far more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people
is required from judges and, though unwritten, has been most
strictly observed. They are at once privileged and restricted.30

He once wrote,
Our judges extend impartially to all men protection, not only
against wrongs committed by private persons, but also against
the arbitrary acts of public authority. The independence of the
courts is, to all of us, the guarantee of freedom and the equal
rule of law.
It must, therefore, be the first concern of . . . a free country
to preserve and maintain the independence of the courts of
justice, however inconvenient that independence may be, on
occasion, to the government . . . .31

If an emergency required limits on judicial authority through
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Churchill held that
only a nation’s legislature could authorize such a constitutional
departure.32 In an address to the American Bar Association in
1957, he said:
National governments may indeed obtain sweeping emergency
powers for the sake of protecting the community in times of war
or other perils. These will temporarily curtail or suspend the
freedom of ordinary men and women, but special powers must
be granted by the elected representatives of those same people
by Congress or by Parliament, as the case may be.33

Such powers “do not belong to the State or Government as a
right. Their exercise needs vigilant scrutiny, and their grant may
30

Id. at 8548.
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39.
32
See Liberty and the Law (July 31, 1957), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 8682–83.
33
See id; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”); Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.) (“An
Act for the better secureing the Liberty of the Subject and for Prevention of
Imprisonments beyond the Seas.”); cf. The King’s Dominions (Apr. 20, 1939), in 6
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6105, 6107 (“In the British Empire we not
only look out across the seas towards each other, but backwards to our own history,
to Magna Charta, to Habeas Corpus, to the Petition of Right, to Trial by Jury, to the
English Common Law and to Parliamentary Democracy. These are the milestones
and monuments that mark the path along which the British race has marched to
leadership and freedom.”).
31
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be swiftly withdrawn.”34 On the day that Britain declared war
against Nazi Germany, Churchill said:
Perhaps it might seem a paradox that a war undertaken in the
name of liberty and right should require, as a necessary part of
its processes, the surrender for the time being of so many of the
dearly valued liberties and rights. . . . We are sure that these
liberties will be in hands which will not abuse them, which will
use them for no class or party interests, which will cherish and
guard them, and we look forward to the day . . . when our
liberties and rights will be restored to us, and when we shall be
able to share them with the peoples to whom such blessings are
unknown.35

Indeed, a recent study shows that Churchill exercised more restraint in the use of detention without charge during World War
II than FDR did for his Administration’s broad internment of
Japanese Americans.36
B.

Invoking the Constitution of the Great Republic

When expressing his constitutional ideas, Churchill was fond
of drawing connections with our Constitution.37 He was wellversed in the subject, as he showed in a chapter entitled “The
American Constitution” in one of his final books.38 The ex-Prime
Minister described the backdrop of the Constitutional Convention, the views of some of its leading members, and summarized
the proposal itself before noting:
[A] written constitution carries with it the danger of a cramping
rigidity. What body of men, however far-sighted, can lay down
precepts in advance for settling the problems of future genera34

Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683; see 5 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 5
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 679 (1951) (quoting a cable that Churchill sent to the
Home Secretary stating that the suspension of habeas corpus “must be interpreted
with the utmost vigilance by a Free Parliament”); id. at 680 (quoting another cable
in which Churchill said that suspension was “contrary to the whole spirit of British
public life and British history”).
35
War (Sept. 3, 1939), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6152, 6153.
36
See Amanda L. Tyler, Courts and the Executive in Wartime: A Comparative
Study of the American and British Approaches to the Internment of Citizens During
World War II and Their Lessons for Today, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 796 (2019); see
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding aspects of the
President’s Executive Order on the detention of Japanese-Americans).
37
See, e.g., Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8682 (“It has often been
pointed out that the 5th and 14th Amendments of the American Constitution are an
echo of the Magna Carta.”).
38
See AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 252–66; cf. What Good’s a
Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting the Convention debates).
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tions? The delegates at Philadelphia were well aware of this.
They made provision for amendment, and the document drawn
up by them was adaptable enough in practice to permit changes
in the Constitution. But it had to be proved in argument and
debate and generally accepted throughout the land that any
changes proposed would follow the guiding ideas of the
Founding Fathers. A prime object of the Constitution was to be
conservative; it was to guard the principles and machinery of
[the] State from capricious and ill-considered alteration. In its
fundamental doctrine the American people acquired an institution which was to command the same respect and loyalty as in
England are given to Parliament and Crown.39

Churchill went on to describe the ratification debates in detail.40
He paid special attention to Madison’s Federalist No. 10, which
was quoted at length for its description of factions.41 “The
Federalist letters,” Churchill wrote, “are among the classics of
American literature. Their practical wisdom stands pre-eminent
amid the stream of controversial writing at the time.”42
While acknowledging the political skills of the Framers,
Churchill held that the Constitution was largely a restatement of
British common sense. “At first sight,” he wrote, “this authoritative document presents a sharp contrast with the store of
traditions and precedents that make up the unwritten Constitution of Britain. Yet behind it lay no revolutionary theory.”43 The
text was instead based on
Old English doctrine, freshly formulated to meet an urgent
American need. The Constitution was a reaffirmation of faith
in the principles painfully evolved over the centuries by the
English-speaking peoples. It enshrined long-standing English
ideas of justice and liberty, henceforth to be regarded on the
other side of the Atlantic as basically American.44

Churchill’s view that the Constitution enshrined British
thinking was a staple of his later speeches.45 In a 1950 campaign
address, he said:

39

AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 252–57.
Id. at 257–60.
41
See id. at 258–59.
42
Id. at 258.
43
Id. at 256.
44
Id.
45
The Crown and Parliament (May 27, 1953), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 8485, 8486.
40
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The wisdom of our forebears for more than 300 years has sought
the division of power in the Constitution. . . . The great men
who founded the American Constitution expressed this same
separation of authority in the strongest and most durable form.
Not only did they divide executive, legislative, and judicial functions, but also by instituting a federal system they preserved
immense and sovereign rights to local communities and by all
these means they have maintained—often at some inconvenience—a system of law and liberty under which they have
thrived.46

Three years later, he claimed that “no Constitution was ever
written in better English” than America’s Constitution.47 “The
key thought alike of the British constitutional monarchy and the
republic of the United States,” he stated, “is the hatred of dictatorship. Both here and across the ocean, over the generations
and the centuries the idea of the division of power has lain at the
root of our development. We do not want to live under a system
dominated either by one man or one theme.”48
While there is some truth in Churchill’s view of AngloAmerican constitutional unity, there was a political motive that
probably led him to exaggerate those connections.49 Perhaps the
strongest of his many strong opinions was that a close partnership between the United States and Britain was essential for
world peace.50 Churchill expressed this idea when Hitler was the
46

Woodford Adoption Meeting (Jan. 28, 1950), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 7907, 7912; see “A Hush over Europe” (Aug. 8, 1939), in 6 CHURCHILL
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6149, 6151 (“The architects of the American Constitution
were as careful as those who shaped the British Constitution to guard against the[ir]
whole life and fortunes, and all the laws and freedom of the nation, being placed in
the hands of a tyrant. Checks and counter-checks in the body politic, large
devolutions of State government, instruments and processes of free debate, frequent
recurrence to first principles, the right of opposition to the most powerful governments, and above all ceaseless vigilance, have preserved, and will preserve, the
broad characteristics of British and American institutions.”).
47
The Crown and Parliament, supra note 45.
48
Id.
49
Churchill was aware that there were differences between the two Constitutions. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 2 THE WORLD CRISIS 693 (Free Press 2005)
(1939) (stating that only the United States Constitution “secures to its supreme
executive officer, at once the Sovereign and the Party Leader, such direct personal
authority”); Constitutions of Britain and the United States, supra note 8 (noting “the
profound differences between the Constitutions under which the two Englishspeaking democracies have come to dwell”).
50
See, e.g., Winston S. Churchill, The Union of the English-Speaking Peoples,
NEWS OF THE WORLD, May 15, 1938, reprinted in THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note
5, at 310–18; Anglo-American Unity, in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at
6823, 6823–27.
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enemy and repeated that view when Stalin was the danger.51 In
his renowned “Iron Curtain” speech that anticipated the Cold
War, he gave
the crux of what I have travelled here to say. Neither the sure
prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation
will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special
relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire
and the United States.52

One way to foster that special relationship was by highlighting
the commonalities between British and American law.
C.

Reimagining the Declaration of Independence

The best example of Churchill’s creativity in reading our basic
texts involved the Declaration of Independence.53 In Pauline
Maier’s splendid account of the Declaration’s history, she observed that by World War II Jefferson’s manifesto for revolution
against the Crown was viewed as “a part of the British inheritance as it is of ours.”54 “[J]ust imagine George III’s amazement,”
she wrote, “at learning that the Declaration of Independence
would one day become a constructive part of the British
heritage!”55 The wartime alliance helps explain the evolution in
51
See The Atlantic Charter (Aug. 24, 1941), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra
note 1, at 6472, 6473 (trumpeting his first meeting with President Roosevelt as
symbolizing “something even more majestic—namely; the marshalling of the good
forces of the world against the evil forces which are now so formidable”); see also
Address to the United States Congress (Jan. 17, 1952), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES,
supra note 1, at 8323, 8329 (“[O]ne thing which is exactly the same as when I was
here last. Britain and the United States are working together and working for the
same high cause. . . . Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the twentieth
century is that they tread the same path.”).
52
See The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19, at 7289; see also id. at 7290 (“From
Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
the Continent.”).
53
See Election Address (Oct. 15, 1951), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1,
at 8265, 8268 (“ ‘All men are created equal,’ says the American Declaration of
Independence. ‘All men shall be kept equal,’ say the British Socialist Party.”); The
Twentieth Century—Its Promise and Its Realization (Mar. 31, 1949), in 7
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7801, 7803 (quoting the “famous American
maxim ‘Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed’ ”);
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39 (“[T]he founders of the American
Republic in their Declaration of Independence inculcate as a duty binding upon all
worthy sons of America ‘a frequent recurrence to first principles.’ ”).
54
See MAIER, supra note 14 (quoting Archibald MacLeish, who was the
Librarian of Congress during World War II).
55
Id. at 213.
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the Declaration’s meaning, but Churchill was the most prominent public figure to make the argument that the Declaration
should be understood as an Anglo-American authority on a par
with the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights.56 In so
doing, he advanced the special relationship and blunted the
Declaration’s message of anti-colonialism at a time when the
British Empire was still robust.57
On the Fourth of July in 1918, Churchill gave his first
speech on the Declaration of Independence in support of a resolution providing, in part, that the British people “rejoice that the
love of liberty and justice on which the American nation was
founded should in the present time of trial have united the whole
English-speaking family in a brotherhood of arms.”58 “A great
harmony exists,” he said,
between the spirit and language of the Declaration of Independence and all we are fighting for now. A similar harmony
exists between the principles of that Declaration and all that
the British people have wished to stand for, and have in fact
achieved at last both here at home and in the self-governing
Dominions of the Crown.59

“The Declaration of Independence is not only an American document,” Churchill explained.60
It follows on the Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights as the
third great title-deed on which the liberties of the Englishspeaking people are founded. . . . They spring from the same
source; they come from the same well of practical truth, and
that well is here by the banks of the Thames, in this island
which is the birthplace and origin of the British and American
race.61

He closed by repurposing the Declaration’s pledge of “our lives,
our fortunes, and our sacred honour” as a mantra for the Allied
effort in World War I.62
56
See, e.g., Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10, at 2613–16; see also The Bill
of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.).
57
Cf. A New Experience—Victory (Nov. 10, 1942), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES,
supra note 1, at 6692, 6695 (“I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to
preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”).
58
Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10, at 2613.
59
Id. at 2614.
60
Id.; see AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 189 (“The Declaration was in the
main a restatement of the principles which had animated the Whig struggle against
the later Stuarts and the English Revolution of 1688 . . . .”).
61
Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10.
62
Id. at 2616.
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Into the 1950s, Churchill continued to invoke the Declaration of Independence to support Anglo-American cooperation.63
The Iron Curtain address made the point this way:
[W]e must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great
principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint
inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus [Act of
1679], trial by jury, and the English common law find their
most famous expression in the American Declaration of
Independence.64

A year later in Life magazine, Churchill repeated his call for a
special relationship between Britain and the United States and
defended the anticommunist Truman Doctrine by asking Americans “to march forward unswervingly upon the path to which
[d]estiny has called them, guided by the principles of the Declaration of Independence, expressed so carefully and so pregnantly
in the balanced, well-shaped language of the 18th century, by the
founders of the greatest State in the world.”65 And in 1950, he
gave an Independence Day address and stated that both nations
must forever be on our guard, and always vigilant against
[tyranny]—in all this we march together. Not only, if need be,
under the fire of the enemy but also in those realms of thought
which are consecrated to the rights and the dignity of man, and
which are so amazingly laid down in the Declaration of Independence, which has become a common creed on both sides of
the Atlantic Ocean.66

Notably absent from Churchill’s reading of the Declaration
as a common law text was any mention of its revolutionary
themes.67 On one level this makes sense because he was trying to
downplay the divisions between Britain and America. On another
level, though, Churchill’s zeal for Britain’s empire could not be
reconciled with Jefferson’s statement of national self-determina-

63

See The Anglo-American Alliance, supra note 14.
The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19.
65
Winston S. Churchill, If I Were an American, LIFE MAG., Apr. 14, 1947,
reprinted in THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 390; see DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
TRUMAN 547–49 (1992) (describing President Truman’s pledge to support proWestern governments in Greece and Turkey against Soviet aggression after Britain
no longer could).
66
See The Anglo-American Alliance, supra note 14.
67
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (U.S. 1776) (“[W]henever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . .”).
64
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tion. In his 1918 speech, he acknowledged that in the Declaration of Independence “we lost an [e]mpire, but by it we also
preserved an [e]mpire. By applying its principles and learning
its lesson we have maintained our communion with the powerful
Commonwealths our children have established beyond the
seas.”68 Some of Great Britain’s former colonies would probably
beg to differ with this rosy description. In any event, by weaving
the Declaration of Independence into the common law, Churchill
sought to tame this radical authority and gave the text an
evolving rather than a fixed construction.69
II. DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Part explores Churchill’s unorthodox explanation for
judicial review in the United States and for its absence in Great
Britain. While he admired the flexibility of the uncodified British
Constitution, during the New Deal he reached the conclusion
that judicial review of our “fixed” Constitution was essential
because of America’s diversity.70 Churchill’s diversity hypothesis
contradicts Madison’s reasoning in Federalist No. 10 and is a
testable hypothesis for future research about how judicial review
is practiced across the world and in the fifty states.71
A.

Flexible vs. Fixed

Until the 1930s, Churchill criticized written constitutions as
too rigid.72 In a 1908 speech, he stated: “No country in the world
has such a flexible Constitution as ours. The Constitutions of
France, Germany, and the United States are far more rigid, far

68

See Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10.
See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 1 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES:
THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 225 (1956) (“This slow but continuous growth of what is
popularly known as ‘case law’ ultimately achieved much the same freedoms and
rights for the individual as are enshrined in other countries by written instruments
such as the Declarations of the Rights of Man and the spacious and splendid
provisions of the American Declaration of Independence and constitutional guarantees of civil rights.”).
70
See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; see also Liberty and the
Law, supra note 32, at 8683 (making the same point).
71
See infra text accompanying notes 101–103.
72
See Prohibition, supra note 8 (criticizing the “rat-trap rigidity of the American
Constitution”); supra text accompanying note 39. In this respect, Churchill was
following in a tradition in British commentary on the United States Constitution.
See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 30 (photo. reprt. 2007) (1873)
(stating that under the American Constitution “[t]here is no elastic element,
everything is rigid, specified, dated.”) (emphasis omitted).
69
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more fortified against popular movements than the Constitution
under whose gradual evolution this peaceful, law-abiding country
has dwelt secure for so many centuries.”73 Two decades later, he
said:
I am not one of those who either hope much or apprehend much
from the attempt to develop constitutional arrangements for the
British Empire of a rigid character. The whole advantage of our
position has been that we have been able to get on without
writing things down on paper. The British Empire could not
have been built up by anything that could be written on parchment.74

And in a book on World War I first published in 1927, Churchill
wrote:
The rigid Constitution of the United States, the gigantic scale
and strength of its party machinery, the fixed terms for which
public officers and representatives are chosen, invest the
President with a greater measure of autocratic power than was
possessed before the war by the Head of any great [s]tate.75

What did Churchill mean when he called our Constitution
rigid? In part, he was referring to the fixed terms of elected
officials, which stood in contrast to Parliament’s freedom to set
the length of its own term.76 He also noted the supermajority
requirement to ratify an Article V amendment.77 But Churchill
also believed that judicial review made a constitution fixed. Not
long after the Supreme Court issued A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States78 in 1935, he wrote an op-ed on “The
Constitutions of Great Britain and the United States.”79 In the
op-ed, he told British readers that “the Supreme Court has given
a unanimous judgment which stultifies and largely paralyzes the
whole vast policy of social and economic change embodied in

73
Election Address (Apr. 14, 1908), in 1 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at
943, 953.
74
The Empire (Oct. 18, 1926), in 4 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4103,
4104.
75
THE WORLD CRISIS, supra note 49, at 679.
76
The current law on that question is the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, c.
14, § 1 (UK), which can, of course, be changed by Parliament.
77
See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40 (noting that constitutional amendments were ratified “after prodigious struggles, on only a score of
occasions during the whole history of the United States”).
78
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
79
Constitutions of Britain and the United States, supra note 8.
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President Roosevelt’s National [Industrial] Recovery Act.”80 This
was possible because
[in the United States] a written Constitution [is] enforced by a
Supreme Court according to the letter of the law, under which
anyone may bring a test case challenging not merely the
interpretation of a law, but the law itself, and if the Court
decides for the appellant, be he only an owner of a few chickens,
the whole action of the Legislature and the Executive becomes
to that extent null and void.81

“It is very difficult,” Churchill wrote,
[f]or us . . . to realize the kind of deadlock which has been
reached in the United States. . . . Imagine—to take an instance
nearer home—some gigantic measure of insurance as big as our
widows’ pensions, health and employment insurance rolled
together, which had deeply interwoven itself in the whole life of
the people, upon which every kind of contract and business
arrangement had been based, being declared to have no validity
by a court of law.82

The Depression and the New Deal clarified Churchill’s
thinking on the purpose and enforcement of constitutional law.
Although he worked closely with President Roosevelt during
World War II, Churchill was a fairly detached observer of FDR
prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1940.83 For example, in a
1934 article, he praised the “renaissance of creative effort with
which the name of Roosevelt will always be associated” but added
that “[a]lthough the dictatorship is veiled by constitutional forms,
it is none the less effective.”84 Two years later, he made the
following bold prediction about the looming clash between FDR
and the Supreme Court:
[A]fter all the complaints against the rigidity of the United
States Constitution and the threats of a presidential election on
this issue, none of the suggested constitutional amendments has
so far been adopted by the Administration. This may explain
why the “Nine Old Men” of the Supreme Court have not been
more seriously challenged. But the challenge may come at a
later date, though it would perhaps be wiser to dissociate it

80

Id.
See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40.
82
Id.
83
See Winston Churchill, While the World Watches, COLLIER’S, Dec. 29, 1934, at
24, 24.
84
Id.
81
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from any question of the age of the judges, lest it be the liberal
element in the court which is weakened.85

FDR blundered and did exactly what Churchill warned against.
By making his “Court-packing” plan contingent on age (a new
Justice would be added for each current one over the age of
seventy), Roosevelt undercut support within the Court and
among many potential allies in Congress.86
B.

What Good’s a Constitution?

Churchill’s deepest reflection on constitutionalism came in a
Collier’s magazine article published in August 1936.87 He opened
that piece with a fiery denunciation of socialism in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union.88 But Churchill said that the United
States also suffered from “an extension of the activities of the
Executive . . . . There have been efforts to exalt the power of the
central government and to limit the rights of individuals.”89 He
explained the basic question presented by these developments
is whether a fixed constitution is a bulwark or a fetter. From
what I have written it is plain that I incline to the side of those
who would regard it as a bulwark, and that I rank the citizen
higher than the State, and regard the State as useful only in so
far as it preserves his inherent rights.90

85
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. Churchill was presumably
talking about Justice Louis Brandeis, who was eighty years old when the Courtpacking plan was introduced. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE
714–15 (2009). Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who was seventy-five when the
Court packing plan was being debated in 1937, also sided with the Administration in
some of the most divisive cases. See JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE
HUGHES: THE PRESIDENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE EPIC BATTLE OVER THE
NEW DEAL 11 (2012) (stating that Hughes was born in 1862); see also R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374–92 (1935) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the
Court’s invalidation of the Railroad Retirement Act); Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935) (upholding, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, President Roosevelt’s
controversial devaluation of Treasury bonds).
86
See, e.g., JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE
SUPREME COURT 338–39 (2010); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 187–90 (Octagon
Books 1979) (1941).
87
See What Good’s A Constitution?, supra note 4, at 22.
88
See id. (“In Germany, for instance, the alliance between national patriotism,
tradition and pride on the one hand, and discontent about the inequalities of wealth
on the other, made the Weimar Constitution ‘a scrap of paper.’ ”); id. at 39 (“Much
the same thing has happened in Russia. The powerful aid of national sentiment and
imperialist aspirations has been invoked to buttress a decaying Communism.”).
89
Id. at 39.
90
Id.
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Churchill’s praise for a fixed constitution, which marked a change
from his prior views, may have been motivated by the spread of
totalitarianism. But why did Britain not also need a codified constitution to preserve liberty?
Churchill’s answer was that America’s diversity required a
fixed constitution. “When one considers the immense size of the
United States,” he explained,
and the extraordinary contrasts of climate and character which
differentiate the forty-eight sovereign states of the American
Union, as well as the inevitable conflict of interests between
North and South and between East and West, it would seem
that the participants of so vast a federation have the right to
effectual guarantees upon the fundamental laws, and that these
should not be easily changed to suit a particular emergency or
fraction of the country.91

Quoting James Wilson at the Constitutional Convention, he said
that “[t]he founders of the Union, although its corpus was then so
much smaller, realized this with profound conviction. They did
not think it possible to entrust legislation for so diverse a community and enormous an area to a simple majority.”92 “The socalled ‘rigidity’ of the American Constitution,” Churchill
reasoned, “is in fact the guarantee of freedom to its . . .
component parts.”93 Moreover, “[i]t may well be that this very
quality of rigidity, which is today thought to be so galling, has
been a prime factor in founding the greatness of the United
States.”94 To frame a “constitution for a ‘United States of Europe’
for which so many thinkers on this side of the ocean aspire, fixed

91

Id. at 40.
Id. (“ ‘To control the powers and conduct of the legislature,’ said a leading
member of the Convention of 1787, ‘by an overruling constitution was an
improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the American
States.’ ”); see also 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 361 (Merill Jenson ed., 1976) (providing the original Wilson
quotation).
93
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; see id. (“That a set of
persons, however eminent, carried into office upon some populist heave should have
the power to make the will of a bare majority effective over the whole of the United
States might cause disasters upon the greatest scale from which recovery would not
be swift or easy.”).
94
Id; see id. (“ ‘Taking the rigidity out of the American Constitution’ means, and
is intended to mean, new gigantic accessions of power to the dominating centre of
government and giving it the means to make new fundamental laws enforceable
upon all American citizens.”).
92
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and almost unalterable guarantees would be required by the
acceding nations.”95
By contrast, Churchill cast Britain as a homogeneous nation
that did not need judicial review.96 In his 1957 speech to the
ABA, he spelled this idea out more clearly: “I speak, of course, as
a layman on legal topics, but I believe that our differences are
more apparent than real, and are the result of geographical and
other physical conditions rather than any true division of
principle.”97 “The Supreme Court survived and flourished in the
United States,” Churchill explained, “England was too compact
and too uniform a community to have need of it. But the Supreme Court in America has often been the guardian and
upholder of American liberty. Long may it continue to thrive.”98
To return to his 1936 essay, Churchill conceded that the “free”
and “flexible” British Constitution could not be applied to the
diverse lands that were self-governing dominions or outright
colonies in the Empire.99 But “[i]n this small island of Britain we
make laws for ourselves,” by which he meant that an omnipotent
Parliament did not threaten freedom there.100
There are discordant echoes of Federalist No. 10 in Churchill’s thinking. Madison contended that smaller and more uniform communities would be more likely to oppress people.101
95

Id.
Cf. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 125–26 (“England has long described itself as
a homogeneous country in which discrimination was a problem that could be
adequately handled through ordinary political processes.”). Northern Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales probably never saw Britain as Churchill did, and England is
certainly not homogeneous today. See id. at 128 (expressing doubt in the 1990s that
England was a monoculture). This probably means that judicial review is now
necessary in Britain. The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s opinion invalidating the
lengthy prorogation of Parliament over Brexit is a step in that direction. See R v.
Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [70] (appeal taken from Eng. & Scot.)
97
Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683. Chief Justice Warren attended
Churchill’s speech. See The Law Society’s Dinner at Guildhall in London, July 31, 43
A.B.A. J. 911, 911–12 (1957) [hereinafter The Law Society’s Dinner].
98
Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683. In the official collection of
Churchill’s speeches, he is quoted in the ABA address: “Forty-nine states, each with
fundamental rights and a different situation, is a different proposition [for judicial
review].” Id. The ABA Journal quotes the line, though, as “[f]orty-eight states . . . .”
The Law Society’s Dinner, supra note 97, at 914. I do not know which is correct
rendition of Churchill’s remarks, though the basic point is the same.
99
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40.
100
Id. See also Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683 (stating that parliamentary sovereignty was “all very well in an island which has not been invaded for
nearly 2,000 years.”).
101
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 63–64 (“The smaller the
society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the
96
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Larger, more diverse states would be less likely to produce
tyranny because the diverse elements would be hard-pressed to
assemble a majority coalition.102 Churchill said the opposite. He
thought that diversity made majority abuses more likely and
thus judicial review, which Madison did not discuss in The
Federalist, more essential.103 Madison did recognize that constitutional structures were important to impede a national faction,104 so one could say that Churchill was just buttressing that
principle with judicial review. But the British Constitution
contains few structural impediments to majority rule, as most of
the relevant powers are concentrated in the House of Commons.
Still, Churchill did not consider this a significant problem
because Britain was small and compact.105
While Churchill gave judicial review its due for larger and
more diverse societies, he closed his article on a cautionary note
that was almost certainly a critical comment about some of the
Court’s decisions striking down aspects of the New Deal. “The
rigidity of the Constitution of the United States,” he wrote,
is the shield of the common man. But that rigidity ought not to
be interpreted by pedants. In England we continually give new
interpretation to the archaic language of our fundamental institutions, and this is no new thing in the United States. The judifewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found
of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority,
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression.”).
102
See id. at 64 (“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and
to act in unison with each other.”).
103
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. Consider an analogy to en
banc review in federal circuit courts. A circuit that is relatively homogeneous with a
small number of judges does not need to resort to en banc review because a given
panel of that court will probably not disagree sharply with a different panel. As a
circuit grows more diverse with more judges, the need for en banc review is greater
because the possibility that one panel will be an outlier is greater. En banc review
can be understood as judicial review of a panel decision in this context.
104
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 349–51 (James Madison).
105
On the other hand, after the Labor Party won the 1945 election and
embarked on a sweeping program of nationalization, Churchill did grumble about
the need to limit “single-chamber” democracy. Election Address (Feb. 4, 1950), in 8
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7914, 7915 (“There is another element of
instability in our British life which does not exist in most of the other free countries
of the world. There is no written constitution.”). What he meant, though, was that
the Conservative Party should be returned to power. See id. (“I rest my hopes on a
new Parliament.”).
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ciary have obligations which go beyond expounding the mere
letter of the law. The Constitution must be made to work.106

“So august a body as the Supreme Court in dealing with law,” he
concluded, “must also deal with the life of the United States, and
words, however solemn, are only true when they preserve their
vital relationship to facts.”107
Was Churchill right to connect diversity with judicial review? The answer is unclear and calls for empirical study. Such
an inquiry will be difficult, though, if the comparisons are made
between different nations. For instance, how should diversity be
measured among democracies? Can common-law and civil-law
systems be compared in a sensible way? What other variables
may explain the frequency of judicial review? This Article cannot
answer all of these questions. Nevertheless, two examples provide modest support for Churchill’s claim. One of the most—if
not the most—diverse democracies in the world is India.
Consistent with what may be labelled Churchill’s “diversity
hypothesis,” the Indian Supreme Court is widely seen as one of
the most aggressive in exercising judicial review.108 Meanwhile,
one of the least—if not the least—diverse democracies in the
world is Japan. And the Japanese Supreme Court is widely seen
as one of the most reluctant to use judicial review, as the
diversity hypothesis would suggest.109 These two data points,
though, are insufficient to establish a correlation between
diversity and judicial review.
Another empirical study might look at how judicial review
differs among the fifty states. State constitutional law is an
understudied field.110 While there is at least one thoughtful analysis of how state courts interpret statutes,111 no corresponding
article exists on how state courts undertake constitutional review
106

What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40.
Id.
108
See Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme
Court: Towards an Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 55, 95–96
(2009).
109
See David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2011) (exploring why the Japanese Supreme Court uses judicial
review so rarely).
110
See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–6 (2018) (making this point and seeking to
rectify that deficit).
111
See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750
(2010).
107
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under state constitutions.112 Nevertheless, because the legal culture among the states is more similar than the legal culture
across national boundaries, one obstacle to a successful examination of the diversity hypothesis would be reduced. Likewise,
claims about the relative diversity in each state, or at least the
ones being compared, may be simpler than assessing relative
diversity across nations. Again, though, this Article does not
undertake such an interstate comparison.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Churchill’s diversity
hypothesis is correct, what are the consequences for judicial
review? In a 2019 dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan argued that
“it is hard to overstate the value, in a country like ours, of
stability in the law.”113 What the Justice meant by “a country
like ours” is not clear, but one possible reading is that the United
States is a more diverse country now than when Churchill was
writing in the 1930s. Perhaps then, in an increasingly diverse
society the fixed quality of its constitution becomes more
critical.114 This could be true for several reasons. First, using
unwritten conventions as a substitute for fixed constitutional
guarantees is less plausible since more diverse states lack the
common culture necessary to agree on norms.115 Second, diverse
societies may disagree more often or more deeply about what
nebulous constitutional provisions mean.116 Third, a wider range
112

A complicating factor is that some state constitutions are easy to amend
through ballot propositions and others are not easy to amend. Judicial review in
practice might differ significantly between these two types of states. Some states
also rely more heavily on elected judges than others, which may account for some
distinctions.
113
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
114
One objection to this argument is that British courts traditionally applied
stare decisis strictly, as Churchill himself noted. See Liberty and the Law, supra note
32, at 8683 (stating that his island had “a small legal profession, tightly bound by
precedent”); W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of
Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797, 797–98 (1967) (stating that from
1898 to 1966 the House of Lords maintained that they could overrule their own
precedents). Stare decisis in this context, though, was dictated by parliamentary
sovereignty rather than by a principle that the British Constitution should be fixed.
Another way of putting this is that British courts were always applying the strong
presumption of stare decisis that American courts use only for statutory cases. See,
e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015) (stating that “stare decisis
carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute”).
115
For a fine discussion of constitutional norms, see Keith E. Whittington, The
Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1847.
116
With respect to Article Five amendments, one might expect that a more
diverse society would have a harder time achieving the supermajority necessary for
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of opinion or interests in a state may increase the chances that,
without a constitutional barrier, a majority will enact policies
that are unintentionally harmful to a minority.117 Fourth, the
presence of more “discrete and insular minorities” may create
tensions that raise the risk of discrimination in the absence of
fixed constitutional restrictions.118
But if our growing diversity means that the Constitution
should become more rigid, there is more than one way of
achieving that end. One is interpretation according to original
public meaning.119 If the meaning of the text is generally settled
by its understanding at the time of ratification, then greater
stability can result if courts apply that meaning consistently.120
On the other hand, a faithful application of original public
meaning means that contrary precedents or practices must
sometimes be overruled if they were based on other interpretive
premises.121 In effect, originalism holds out the promise of longrun certainty at the expense of disruption in the here and now.
Another way of making the Constitution more rigid is through a
strict adherence to stare decisis. Indeed, Justice Kagan was
referring to stare decisis in her statement that a country like ours
needs stability in the law.122 Judges must adapt precedents to
new facts, but a strong presumption that precedent will be
followed fosters certainty if courts apply the common-law method
in good faith. Trust in that good faith, however, might be eroded
by diversity, as the common-law method is itself largely a distilratification. Thus, in this sense the Constitution does tend to become more rigid as
diversity grows. An argument can be made that diverse states should not let
constitutional amendments be ratified by a single ballot proposition that requires
only majority support, in the way that states like California permit.
117
In other words, a majority may be unaware that a particular action is
injurious to a viewpoint that is very different from and not represented in the ruling
coalition.
118
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This
kind of wrongful discrimination could be undertaken with the goal of assimilation.
119
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact
in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4–5, 7 (2015).
120
For a recent discussion of how the application of original public meaning can
nonetheless change over time, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY &
CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(2019).
121
Another concern is that the original public meaning of a constitutional
provision can be open-ended (for instance, “due process of law”) or ambiguous, such
that it does little to fix legal concepts in a meaningful sense. That said, originalism
does provide greater certainty in some circumstances than a common-law approach.
122
See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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lation of unwritten norms. Thus, the implications of the diversity
hypothesis for the practice of judicial review are uncertain.
In sum, Churchill’s comparative analysis of judicial review
should be assessed by empirical scholarship. If correlation and
causation are proved between diversity and the practice of judicial review in a democracy, then further thought should be given
to any normative consequences that may flow from that conclusion beyond the basic need for judicial review.
III. PROHIBITION, JIM CROW, AND UNEQUAL EFFECTS
This Part discusses how Churchill’s disdain for Prohibition
led to his epiphany that the unequal distribution of constitutional principles can harm constitutional authority.123 To make
that claim, he drew a direct connection between the failure of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the impotence of the Fifteenth
Amendment in the 1920s. In both cases, Churchill wrote that an
overwhelming majority with honorable motives was undone by
enacting a broad reform that was too unevenly spread.124 The
result of that unequal spread was that the political support
needed to sustain the constitutional rule could not be maintained. Churchill’s holistic observation about law’s practical
limits supports one explanation for Reconstruction’s weakness
before the 1960s and provides a justification for some antimajoritarian features in the American constitutional structure.125
A.

The Bootlegger and the Klansman

Fresh off a lecture tour of the United States in 1929,
Churchill wrote an op-ed in The Daily Telegraph outlining his
123
Churchill’s view of Prohibition was probably influenced by his beverage
tastes. See JENKINS, supra note 2, at 356 (stating that Churchill “did not drink as
much as he was commonly thought to do, although this is not incompatible with his
being a fairly heavy and consistent imbiber”); see also Prohibition and Civil Liberties
(Mar. 17, 1930), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4726, 4726–27 (“[T]here
is one feature of the prohibition movement which excites my indignation. There are
still people in the United States who obtain indulgence in alcoholic liquor, and
among those people I heard the expression ‘hooch’ sometimes used. It caused me
great pain. What an expression to describe one of the gifts of the gods to man.”).
124
Prohibition, supra note 8.
125
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 100–02 (2004)
(explaining how the “Great Migration” of Blacks from the South to the North
promoted civil rights); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–36, 556–57
(2013) (invalidating the preclearance coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act in
part because not all parts of the nation were covered).
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views on Prohibition. “The attempt of the Legislature to prevent
by a stroke of the pen 120,000,000 persons from drinking spirits,
wines, or even beer,” Churchill said, “is the most amazing exhibition alike of the arrogance and of the impotence of a majority
that the history of representative institutions can show.”126 He
then added that
[t]he extreme self-assertion which leads an individual to impose
his likes and dislikes upon others, the spasmodic workings of
the electoral machine, the hysteria of wartime on the home
front, and the rat-trap rigidity of the American Constitution
have combined to produce on a gigantic scale a spectacle at once
comic and pathetic.127

Churchill also told the British public that “[m]illions of people of
every class who vote dry, and thereby assume moral responsibility for all that the attempted enforcement of Prohibition
involves, do not hesitate to procure and consume alcoholic
beverages whenever they require them.”128
Churchill then reflected upon what this state of affairs said
about majority rule in a constitutional democracy. “Obviously,”
he began, “there are limitations upon the power of legislative
majorities. It is easy to pass a law.”129 In considering those intrinsic limits, leaders must realize that
[n]o folly is more costly than the folly of intolerant idealism.
Follies which tend towards vice encounter at every stage in free
and healthy communities enormous checks and correctives from
the inherent goodness and sanity of human nature; but follies

126

Prohibition, supra note 8.
Id. The point about wartime hysteria was astute, as many observers attribute the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to anti-German sentiment directed at brewers who were almost exclusively of German descent. See AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 416 (2005); see also DANIEL OKRENT,
LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 100 (2010) (quoting a proProhibition activist who argued in 1918: “We have German enemies across the
water . . . . We have German enemies in this country too. And the worst of all our
German enemies, the most treacherous, the most menacing, are Pabst, Schlitz,
Blatz, and Miller.”).
128
Prohibition, supra note 8; see id. (“Such a divorce between the civic act and
private conduct would only be possible in a sphere where the vote of the legislative
institution did not correspond to the moral convictions and deep-seated habits of the
nation.”).
129
Id.
127
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sustained by lofty ideas go far, and set up strange and sinister
reactions.130

He added that
[a] law which does not carry with it the assent of public opinion
or command the convictions of the leading elements in a
community may endure, but cannot succeed; and under modern
conditions in a democratic country it must, in the process of
failure, breed many curious and dangerous evils.131

He then made what initially looks like a shocking comparison between Prohibition and the absence of Black suffrage in the
South during the 1920s. Here is the relevant passage in full:
The melancholy era which followed the victory of the North
in the American Civil War affords a glaring example. Inspired
by the noblest ideals—the abolition of slavery—animated by
fierce war hatred and party lust, the conquerors decreed that
[B]lack and white should vote on equal terms throughout the
Union, and the famous Fifteenth Amendment was added to the
Constitution of the United States. Overwhelming force was at
their disposal, with every disposition to use it against the
prostrate and disarmed Confederacy. The North were no more
inconvenienced by the voting of a few handfuls of [Black people]
scattered among their large population, and being outvoted on
all occasions, than is a teetotaler by Prohibition.
But the South had different feelings. After years of waste,
friction, and actual suffering, the Fifteenth Amendment was
reduced by a persistent will-power of the minority and through
many forms of artifice and violence to a dead letter. The Southern [Black people] have the equal political rights it was the
boast of the Constitution to accord them; but for two
generations it has been well understood that they are not to use
them in any State or District where they would make any
difference.132

Churchill concluded that “[a]s with the Fifteenth, so will it be
with the Eighteenth Amendment.”133

130
Id.; see id. (“When standards of conduct or morals which are beyond the
normal public sentiment of a great community are professed and enforced, the
results are invariably evasion, subterfuge, and hypocrisy.”).
131
Id. (invoking the Declaration of Independence by asking whether it is
“necessary for the purposes of ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness’ that vast sums
of money should be spent, and hordes of officials employed against sober and
responsible citizens who wish to do no more than drink wine or beer as they would in
any other country in the civilized world”).
132
Id.
133
Id.

742

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.94:715

There is a great deal to unpack here, but let us begin with
the racist premises underlying Churchill’s history of the Fifteenth Amendment.134 In the 1920s, the dominant view of white
historians was that Reconstruction was an exercise in Northern
vengeance characterized by rampant graft.135 This scholarship,
with an assist from the silent film Birth of a Nation, fixed on “the
national consciousness an image of Reconstruction as a disastrous error, an era of misgovernment and corruption, the lowest
point in the saga of American democracy.”136 Indeed, when Ron
Chernow published his acclaimed biography of Ulysses S. Grant
in 2017, Grant’s Administration remained tarnished by a reputation for incompetence and corruption that was a favorite
narrative of Southern apologists for Jim Crow.137 From this mythology, Churchill absorbed the idea that Reconstruction was
motivated in part by “fierce war hatred and party lust” and
produced “waste, friction, and actual suffering” among Southern
whites.138 It is hard to fault him for relying on the conventional
wisdom, though given his own positive views of white supremacy
he was clearly not a skeptic here as on other issues.139
134

See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 4 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
PEOPLES: THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES 306–13 (1958); see id. at 310–11 (“[Black men]
voters were in a majority in five states. Yet the [Black man] was merely the dupe of
his ill-principled white leaders.”).
135
The first devastating response to this consensus did not come until later. See
W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE
PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 329, 648–49 (Transaction Publishers 2013) (1935).
136
Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—and ViceVersa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012); see Justin Collings, The Supreme
Court and the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 292–94 (2019) (exploring the
influence of the racist “Dunning School” of Reconstruction history on the Court’s
opinions); see also KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 66 (“The tremendous popularity of
D.W. Griffith’s epic film Birth of a Nation (1915), which glorified the Confederacy,
vilified Reconstruction, and portrayed blacks as ‘women chasers and foul fiends,’
typified the national racial mood.”).
137
See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 856 (2017) (“For a long time after the Civil War,
under the influence of southern historians, Reconstruction was viewed as a catastrophic error, a period of corrupt carpetbag politicians and illiterate black
legislators, presided over by the draconian rule of U.S. Grant.”).
138
See Prohibition, supra note 8; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139
See, e.g., LARRY P. ARNN, CHURCHILL’S TRIAL: WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE
SALVATION OF FREE GOVERNMENT 104 (2015) (describing Kenyans in 1906 as “lighthearted, tractable, if brutish children . . . capable of being instructed and raised from
their present degradation” (alteration in original) (quoting WINSTON SPENCER
CHURCHILL, MY AFRICAN JOURNEY 37–38 (1909))); see also id. (“The Indians of East
Africa are mainly of a very low class of coolies, and the idea that they should be put
on an equality with the Europeans is revolting to every white man throughout
British Africa.” (quoting Letter from Winston S. Churchill to Edwin Montagu
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Nonetheless, Churchill’s account of how the Fifteenth Amendment unraveled was not a whitewash and connects up with an
important point that is stressed by modern work on Reconstruction.140 He noted that there were few Blacks in the North in 1870
and therefore the effect of the suffrage extension was sharply
different in each region.141 Why did this disparity matter? Part
of the answer is that white Southerners were eager to resist this
constitutional requirement.142 The other is that white Northerners were less eager to defend the requirement because there
was no natural political constituency in those states for doing
so—in other words, Black voters.143 In other words, the Fifteenth
Amendment created a large unequal effect that proved fatal to its
enforcement.144 This disparity did not change until the Great
Migration of Blacks from the South to the North began after
World War I.145 Over time, the presence of more Black people in
the North put pressure on politicians there—who needed their
votes—to take stronger action on voting rights and enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment.146

(October 8, 1921), in 10 THE CHURCHILL DOCUMENTS: CONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION, APRIL 1921–NOVEMBER 1922, 1644 (Martin Gilbert ed., 1977))).
140
See Prohibition, supra note 8. Churchill did not mince words about the fact
that the South used trickery and violence to nullify Black suffrage. Id. (observing
correctly that the Fifteenth Amendment was a legal fiction in the South by the
1920s).
141
See id. Churchill described this with the pejorative expression that Northern
whites were not “inconvenienced” by Black voting in their states. See id.
142
See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 37–38 (2010).
143
KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 12.
144
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contained a less coercive
means to produce Black suffrage in the South, fared no better. See, e.g., Gerard N.
Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
774, 788–90 (2018) (providing some background on Section 2).
145
See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 100 (stating that the Great Migration’s “contribution to . . . racial change was substantial” because “they [Black men]
relocated from a region of pervasive disenfranchisement to one that extended
suffrage without racial restriction.”).
146
See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 80 (1999); see also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 65, at 590 (quoting a political
memorandum to President Truman advising him that “the northern [Black] vote
today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical
reason that [Black people] not only vote in a block but are geographically
concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New
York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan”).
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In a sense, Churchill was making a public choice claim about
the Constitution before public choice theory was first articulated.147
Public choice theorists argue, in part, that elected officials tend
to enact policies with concentrated benefits for a relatively small
group and diffuse costs for everyone else because that combination yields a stable base of support.148 Those receiving the
benefits have a strong incentive to maintain the policy and can
organize more easily to express that support.149 Meanwhile,
those bearing the costs find organizing harder (due to their
numbers) and lack a strong motive to act. Churchill was describing the contrary situation. The costs of the Fifteenth Amendment were concentrated—in the South—and the benefits outside
of the South were diffuse. In that sort of case, resisting the law
is much easier and more probable while sustained enforcement is
more challenging and less likely.150 Granting suffrage to Black
men in the South created a concentrated benefit for them, of
course, but they could not defend their rights against violent
local whites without significant support from the North.
Churchill’s other original thought was that the Fifteenth and
the Eighteenth Amendments suffered from a similar defect.151
Prohibition also skewed sharply along geographic lines, even
though the divide there was between cities that supported drinking and rural areas that did not.152 A broader point in Churchill’s
op-ed was that a ban on alcohol consumption created an unequal
effect because teetotalers were unaffected by that policy, but the
people who enjoyed drinking were fighting mad. Once again, this
led to a yawning enforcement gap, as the minority was willing to
147
Public choice theory is often credited to a 1951 book by Kenneth J. Arrow,
who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
148
See, e.g., W. Michael Schuster, Public Choice Theory, the Constitution, and
Public Understanding of the Copyright System, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2247, 2252
(2018).
149
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 7 (1965) (laying out the basic framework for organized
action).
150
This is only true if the group bearing the costs is sufficiently large. When
those targeted by regulation are individuals or very small groups, any unequal burden may instead raise constitutional fairness concerns. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting bills of attainder).
151
Another link between the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments is that they
were both the immediate products of a major war, which may explain why elected
officials did not fully appreciate the enforcement issues that would ensue. See supra
text accompanying note 127.
152
See OKRENT, supra note 127, at 104.

2020]

CHURCHILL ON THE CONSTITUTION

745

defy openly the Constitution, but the majority was unwilling to
bear the cost of defense.
B.

Addressing Sharply Unequal Constitutional Effects

Read in light of Churchill’s comments on Prohibition and on
the Fifteenth Amendment, the Constitution’s provisions impeding pure majority rule look better because they may help confer
constitutional legitimacy.153 A goal of the legislative process
should be to ensure that Article V amendments or broad constitutional constructions rest on as equal a distribution of public
opinion as possible.154 The oft-criticized Senate, which gives each
state two votes notwithstanding its population, serves that purpose by increasing the chances that a proposal will have support
that is geographically spread throughout the country.155 The
high hurdle of Article V, which provides that a supermajority of
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the state
legislatures or conventions must agree for the ratification of a
constitutional amendment, does the same.156
With respect to slavery, the Framers took this burdenspreading idea one step further. The Direct Tax Clauses, which
were designed to make the federal taxation of enslaved people
more difficult, accomplished that object through the requirement
that the costs of a slave tax could not be concentrated.157 These
153

The Takings Clause also equalizes the burden of legislation by forcing the
state to pay for projects rather than to concentrate the costs on individual property
owners. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”); Calabresi, supra note 12, at 93.
154
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–13 (2018) (giving an overview of
constitutional constructions). At some point, of course, a lack of majority support
poses its own legitimacy problems. The point is that majority support and observing
the proper forms do not, standing together, make a constitutional reform stick.
155
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The House of Representatives (unintentionally) reflects this principle as well; each state, no matter its population, is
entitled to at least one representative, which results in those states being
overrepresented as compared to the largest states. See Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One
Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional
Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2011). The Senate filibuster with
respect to legislation also arguably serves the goal of ensuring that constitutional
constructions rest on equally distributed support, though I continue to believe that
the filibuster should be suspensory rather than absolute. See Magliocca, supra note
13, at 304–05 (using the House of Lords as a model).
156
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
157
See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers.”); see also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation,
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clauses state that a capitation, or head, tax must be collected
from every state according to its respective population.158 This
meant that a federal slave tax would also be paid by taxpayers in
states without enslaved people. Thus, a slave tax would not
create concentrated costs on slaveowners in the slave states and
diffuse benefits in free states that would benefit from slave tax
revenue without paying the tax. Instead, a slave tax would be
distributed in an equal way across the nation. Not surprisingly,
Congress imposed a slave tax only once, in 1798, and the tax was
only fifty cents per slave.159
One way of viewing these power-sharing arrangements is as
early forms of consociationalism. Consociationalism refers to a
constitution that gives formal rights and veto power to minority
groups.160 The idea behind such a design is that majoritarianism
and individual rights—even when supplemented by tolerance
norms—may not provide adequate assurance for some distinctive
minorities.161 Another justification is that, in diverse nations, the
absence of formal minority trumps will lead to badly unstable

or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.”). On the link between the Direct Tax Clauses
and slavery, see Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796) (opinion of
Patterson, J.). See also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 684 (1895)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Clauses were “originally designed to protect
slave property against oppressive taxation”); id. at 687 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Direct Tax Clauses were “adopted for a special and temporary
purpose, that passed away with the existence of slavery”).
158
Prior to the abolition of slavery, state populations for direct taxes were
calculated through a complex formula that included the infamous Three-Fifths
Clause for slaves. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that apportionment “shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons”).
159
See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869).
160
See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 5 (1977)
(providing the first academic assessment of this governance structure); see also
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional
Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV 1445, 1520 (2016) (“Consociationalism involves constitutional design for societies divided along social, ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines,
and uses entrenched structures such as federalism, power sharing executives, and
proportional representation to ensure the representation of different groups.”).
161
The intellectual godfather of this approach was John C. Calhoun, who developed his theory of “concurrent majorities”—in other words, allowing a majority of
a minority to block a national majority—because he thought that the Constitution
did not provide enough security for slavery. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION
ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 35 (1851).
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constitutional law.162 On this point, there is a link between
Churchill’s claim about the need for judicial review in diverse
states and his concern about the two constitutional amendments
that were ratified over the objections of a minority with intense
preferences. In both cases, he was posing the basic question
about whether a majority has “a right to do anything which it can
get voted by the legislature.”163 Put another way, the diversity in
a society may become so great that the agreement of a broader
range of interests is required for constitutional legitimacy.
Federalism is another structural feature that helps span this
divide. By allowing each state to have a different rule on certain
issues, federalism creates a closer fit between a policy preference
and the political will needed to enforce that preference on a
disgruntled minority. A state majority is generally more capable
of enforcing its law over a state minority than a national majority
over state majorities. An even better match comes if a state pursues federalism within its political or geographic subdivisions.164
Prohibition provides a fine—though belated—example, as after
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment some states allowed
each county to decide for itself on alcohol consumption.165
Given that the Constitution contains safeguards that prevent a constitutional amendment from being ratified when its
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits might render enforcement
problematic, how did the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments
become law? One answer is that the Fifteenth Amendment was
proposed during the absence of some of the ex-Confederate states
from Congress.166 Furthermore, these same states were required
to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment for readmission to the
Union.167 As a result, a more lopsided base of support was used
to obtain ratification due to the special circumstances that followed the Civil War. For the Eighteenth Amendment, the problem was that many of the state legislatures that voted for

162

Whether consociationalism actually reduces social strife is a question that is
beyond the scope of this Article.
163
THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 271.
164
See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) (exploring different aspects of this question).
165
See, e.g., Andrew J. Miller, Crafting a Better Industry: Addressing Problems
of Regulation in the Craft Beer Industry, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.1353, 1363.
166
See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776–2015, at 179 (2016).
167
See id. at 181 (listing those states as Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, and
Georgia).
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ratification were malapportioned in a way that greatly understated their urban population.168 Indeed, the Twenty-First
Amendment used a ratification mode of state conventions rather
than state legislatures to avoid this distortion.169 For the Eighteenth Amendment as well, then, the normal democratic checks
within the Article V process were weaker.
Accordingly, Churchill’s comparison of the Fifteenth and
Eighteenth Amendments yields important insights into the structure and function of the Constitution. Democracy, even when
supported by a supermajority, is not a sufficient condition for
constitutional success. We must “[recognize] the imperfections
which vitiate even the best representative institutions” and accept the need for a relatively equal distribution of constitutional
law.170
CONCLUSION
Winston Churchill was not fond of lawyers. Speaking in 1926
to colonial leaders of the British Empire, he said that their
“discussion of . . . constitutional points . . . is healthy, natural,
and timely, and absolutely appropriate to the occasion, so long as
the discussion is carried on, as it would be, between colleagues
and friends, apart from people such as lawyers who were seeking
to find difficulties.”171 Later, in an op-ed on the Magna Carta, he
wrote: “King John was the kind of tyrant most obnoxious to
England. He was a legal expert.”172 But lawyers were fond of
Churchill. As Chief Justice Earl Warren said in a tribute following the former Prime Minister’s speech to the ABA, he did “more
to subordinate brute force to the rule of law than any man of our
time.”173
Churchill’s extensive commentary on our Constitution opens
up several fruitful avenues for research. The first involves the
relationship between the uncodified British Constitution and the
unwritten aspects of America’s higher law. Considerable atten168
See OKRENT, supra note 127, at 104–05; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565−66 (1964) (holding that state legislative malapportionment violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
169
See AMAR, supra note 127, at 416–17; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3
(specifying ratification by state conventions).
170
Prohibition, supra note 8.
171
The Empire, supra note 74.
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Winston S. Churchill, The Greatest Half-Hour in Our History, DAILY MAIL,
Apr. 13, 1934, at 12.
173
The Law Society’s Dinner, supra note 97, at 951.
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tion is paid to how the Framers were influenced by the examples
of the Crown and Parliament when they wrote the text, but far
too little is given to how the subsequent evolution of British
constitutional practice shaped our construction of the text.174
Indeed, most of Churchill’s analysis was based on a comparison
of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century. This
Article illustrates the benefits of that approach and the need for
more work along those lines. A second open question involves
Churchill’s hypothesis that diversity and judicial review are
connected. International or intrastate studies with appropriate
controls can determine if diversity can explain the frequency or
intensity of judicial review. If such a link can be established,
then further thought should be given to how that point may
relate to appropriate procedures for constitutional amendment.
Third, Churchill’s discussion of Reconstruction and Prohibition
raises the question of how the unequal distribution of a
constitutional principle can detract from that principle’s
authority. More broadly, Churchill’s thought should inform constitutional reforms to make them durable by, perhaps, fashioning
them more narrowly or more evenly.
Lastly, Churchill’s constitutional observations illustrate the
virtue of thinking through America’s entire legal experience and
not just those rare moments where the bulk of that text was
drafted and ratified. His was a very British sensibility in line
with the gradual evolution of his nation’s political order since
time immemorial. As Churchill said on the eve of Elizabeth II’s
coronation in 1953: “Like nature we follow in freedom the paths
of variety and change and our faith is that the mercy of God will
make things . . . better if we all try our best.”175

174
For example, the tradition of designating the President’s closest advisors as
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Britain and not from anything in the text of the original Constitution. Cf. Marbury
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175
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